翻訳と辞書
Words near each other
・ 1983 in the United Arab Emirates
・ 1983 in the United Kingdom
・ 1983 in the United States
・ 1983 in Turkey
・ 1983 in video gaming
・ 1983 in Wales
・ 1983 Independence Bowl
・ 1983 Indiana Hoosiers football team
・ 1983 Indianapolis 500
・ 1983 Individual Speedway Junior European Championship
・ 1983 Individual Speedway World Championship
・ 1983 Intercontinental Cup
・ 1983 Intercontinental Final
・ 1983 Intertoto Cup
・ 1983 Iowa Hawkeyes football team
1983 Israel bank stock crisis
・ 1983 Israel Super Cup
・ 1983 Italian Grand Prix
・ 1983 Italian Open (tennis)
・ 1983 Italian Open – Women's Doubles
・ 1983 Italian Open – Women's Singles
・ 1983 Italy rugby union tour of Canada and U.S.A.
・ 1983 Jade Solid Gold Best Ten Music Awards Presentation
・ 1983 James Hardie 1000
・ 1983 Japan Open Tennis Championships
・ 1983 Japan Open Tennis Championships – Men's Singles
・ 1983 Japan rugby union tour of Wales
・ 1983 Japan Soccer League
・ 1983 Japan Soccer League Cup
・ 1983 Japanese Regional Leagues


Dictionary Lists
翻訳と辞書 辞書検索 [ 開発暫定版 ]
スポンサード リンク

1983 Israel bank stock crisis : ウィキペディア英語版
1983 Israel bank stock crisis

The Bank stock crisis was a financial crisis that occurred in Israel in 1983, during which the stocks of the four largest banks in Israel collapsed. As a consequence, these banks were nationalized by the state.
==Background==
During the 1970s, Bank Hapoalim, and its dominant manager, Yaakov Levinson, began trying to control the bank's stock price in the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. To this end they recommended to their customers to invest in the bank's stocks. These investments allowed the bank to increase its available capital for investments, loans, etc. To get customers to continue investing in the bank's stock, the bank began buying back its own stock, thus creating the appearance of constant demand for the stock, and constantly increasing its value. The bank also gave out generous loans to allow the customers to continue their investments, also profiting from the interest.
These manipulations, or adjustments of the stock prices, by artificially creating demand, seemed to the other banks like a good way of procuring capital from the public, and they slowly adopted the practice as well. Eventually all major banks manipulated their stock price this way, among them Bank Leumi, Discount Bank, Bank Igud, Bank HaMizrachi, and Bank Clali (''General Bank'', now U-Bank). The only prominent bank not to join the adjustments frenzy was HaBank HaBinleumi (a.k.a. the First International Bank of Israel - FIBI).
The adjustments were performed through the use of other companies. For example, Bank Leumi used the "Holdings and Development of The Jewish Colonial Trust Company". The funding for these actions originated in loans from the bank's pension funds and similar sources. Sometimes the banks would practice mutual purchases - one bank would sell its stocks to a second bank, and buy the second bank's stocks for a similar sum.
Under the pressure of the Israeli Securities and Exchange Commission, the banks reported the adjustments in their reports, but these reports were partial, misleading, and sometimes even false. Toward their clients the bank's acted in manner later described by the Beisky Commission as based in their own interests, ignoring the clients' interests.
The adjustment were made possible, in large part, due the banks' unique ownership structure. Bank Hapoalim was controlled by the Histadrut labor union's Workers Company (Hevrat HaOvdim) and Bank Leumi by the "Jewish Colonial Trust". The Hapoel HaMizrachi organisation had almost none of Bank HaMizrachi's stocks, but all of its control shares. The owners' representatives were usually members of the ruling political parties (especially Alignment, and the National Religious Party, or close to them). The banks' managers ran the banks for owners who understood little of banking, and did not involve themselves in these actions. The fourth major bank to join this practice, Discount Bank, was held by the Recanatti Family. Its head, Rafael Recanatti joined the adjustments practice reluctantly, unable to resist the temptation. They later continued the adjustments, unable to stop.
Also contributing to the possibility of the adjustment was the capital structure of the Israeli market. During the years following the establishment of the State of Israel, the governments used the banks as a channel for procuring capital, and instructed them on how to invest their funds. This level of control, coupled with the control of interest rates, allowed the government to effectively "print money", by getting the banks to buy government bonds. Additionally, the banks usually assumed that since their investments and loans in major players of the Israeli market, such as the Kibutzim, were according to the government's wishes, the government would guarantee these loans.
Due to these reasons, the banks believed they could act as they pleased, without fearing the consequences. The banks used the adjustments to get "easy money" by issuing more and more stocks, until, during the 1980s, the banks' stocks accounted for more than 90% of all issued stocks in the stock market. They used the capital thus gained to give out loans and invest, often without due inspection of the debtor's creditworthiness. Also, the banks grew exponentially, building hundreds of new branches and hiring thousands of new employees. The banks' managers paid themselves lavish salaries, and expended money based on the banks' nominal profits, completely unrelated to their real profits.
The large banks got addicted to the easy capital, but this method soon became a trap. Like the government, fearing recession, the banks avoided any move to limit their expenses. They feared for the pockets and jobs of the managers, but also the fact that the first bank to make such a move would appear inferior compared to the other banks.
All of the regulatory bodies were well aware of the adjustments regime, but aside from slight warnings, easily dismissed by the banks' managers, did nothing, failing even to warn the public. The Minister of the Treasury, Aridor, even remarked on television that had he had the funds to do so, he would invest in the stock market.
The adjustments were based in the promise of a constant rise in the banks' stock prices, irrelevant of the economic situation. The artificial prices thus achieved created an Economic bubble, where everyone involved continued investing growing sums of money for lesser returns. Every new issue of bank stocks further destabilized them, since more of the capital was invested in maintaining the adjustment regime, instead of profitable loans. Also, as the bank stock market share grew, the adjustment became weaker, as every cent (Agora, actually) invested by them became a smaller part of the total invested capital.
The real gain (i.e. over and above the Consumer price index) by investing in the banks' stocks diminished, from a 41% gain in 1980, to 34% in 1981, to 28% in 1982. Other investment options, especially purchasing US Dollars became more appealing, and the banks had to transfer more and more funds from their offshore tax havens to keep maintaining the illusion of safety of investing in their stocks.

抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア(Wikipedia)
ウィキペディアで「1983 Israel bank stock crisis」の詳細全文を読む



スポンサード リンク
翻訳と辞書 : 翻訳のためのインターネットリソース

Copyright(C) kotoba.ne.jp 1997-2016. All Rights Reserved.